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Abstract. Multiagent Systems (MAS) research reached a maturity to be con-
fidently applied to real-life complex problems. Successful application of MAS
methods for behavior modeling, strategic reasoning, and decentralized gover-
nance, encouraged us to focus on applicability of MAS techniques in a class of
industrial systems and to elaborate on potentials and challenges for method inte-
gration/contextualization. We direct attention towards a form of industrial prac-
tices called Industrial Symbiosis Systems (ISS) as a highly dynamic domain of
application for MAS techniques. In ISS, firms aim to reduce their material and
energy footprint by circulating reusable resources among the members. To enable
systematic reasoning about ISS behavior and support firms’ (as well as ISS de-
signers’) decisions, we see the opportunity for marrying industrial engineering
with engineering multiagent systems. This enables introducing (1) representa-
tion frameworks to reason about dynamics of ISS, (2) operational semantics to
develop computational models for ISS, and (3) coordination mechanisms to en-
force desirable ISS behaviors. We argue for applicability and expressiveness of
resource-bounded formalisms and norm-aware mechanisms for the design and
deployment of ISS practices. In this proposal, we elaborate on different dimen-
sions of ISS, present a methodological foundation for ISS development, and fi-
nally discuss open problems.
Keywords: Multiagent Systems Application · Resource-Bounded Systems · In-
dustrial Symbiosis · Normative Semantics · Coordination and Control
1 Introduction
As a response to recent environmental concerns on reducing the exploitation and dis-
charge of (pure) resources, the idea to circulate reusable resources (also known as the
practice of circular economy [21]) gained attention in both academia as well as indus-
try. Industrial Symbiosis Systems (ISS) are green/waste-free implementations of the
concept of circular economy in the context of industrial relations [9,35]. For instance,
a cluster of firms A, B, and C may have the chance to reuse each other’s wastes. E.g.,
A’s excess steam can be used in B’s turbines, B’s waste water can be used for cooling
in C, and C’s sludge can substitute a primary input of A. Exploiting such an opportu-
nity may lead to financial as well as socio-ecological gains. As ISS is merely focused
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on circulating non-commoditized resources, e.g., waste material and energy, waiting
for traditional market structures to materialize and successfully implement ISS would
be a guaranteed failure3. Thus, ISS have to be well-designed to be sustainable and in
some cases its stability requires the introduction of external monetary incentives [38].
As Eric Maskin says: “The market is no god—it cannot solve every problem”. This con-
tribution calls for engineering market places for ISS to address four main dimensions
of such systems [9]: temporal evolution, strategic aspects, resource boundedness, and
normativity.
Temporal Evolution (TE): Since ISS builds upon potentially long-term industrial syn-
ergies, it is not similar to single-shot industrial transactions but has a temporal dimen-
sion. The preference on establishing long-term relations is mainly due to presence of
additional costs (such as transportation, treatment, and transaction costs) for imple-
menting ISS. Roughly speaking, firms prefer to implement a relation that lasts—aiming
to avoid renegotiating new relations for each and every transfer of reusable resources.
Moreover, ISS operates within the temporally dynamic industrial context (with respect
to costs, demands, and supply). Thus, engineering attempts to ensure ISS strength, sta-
bility, and fairness have to take into account the dynamicity of such systems over time.
Strategic Aspects (SA): The initiation and stability of relations in ISS critically de-
pends on the dynamics of power and firms’ strategic abilities. In principle, firms act
with respect to their preferences and strategic potentials—which in turn defines their
potential for success4 and their so-called strategic responsibility [36]. Dismissing this
aspect leads to (agent-based) models that represent all firms in the same (power) level
and abstract from the reality of industrial organizations. This call for game forms able
to capture the dynamics of power, executable plans/strategies, and firms’ potential out-
comes (i.e., to specify and analyze “what strategy ensures what situation for what group
of firms”).
Resource Boundedness (RB): In ISS, the implementability of relations is bounded
to physical (i.e., to be circulated) as well as financial (i.e., to be obtained/invested)
resources. Basically, firms have to take into account whether their short-term deci-
sions/actions and long-term plans/strategies are in-line with their available resources.
To capture this, a natural approach would be to model ISS using modeling structures
rooted in resource-bounded logics [4].
Normativity and Coordination (NC): In brief, normativity of ISS refers to the ar-
gument that: “not all forms and potential implementations of industrial symbiosis are
environmentally/socio-economically desirable”. In Section 2.2, we elaborate on this ar-
gument and motivate the need for tailoring coordination mechanisms to nudge the be-
havior of ISS towards collectively desirable ones5.
3 In a more concrete sense, given an environmentally desirable collaboration among A, B, and
C, the allocation of collectively obtained benefits could be problematic in case any firm (group)
can gain more by defecting the ISS. In the game-theoretical language, given an empty core of
the coalitional game, guaranteeing the stability of the collaboration requires external incentives
(see [38]), hence calls for contextualized methods for incentive engineering in ISS.
4 See [26] for the interrelations between preferences, power, and success.
5 As we elaborate later, resource-bounded formalisms capture TE, SA, and RB but we lack
frameworks able to integrate NC as well.
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The literature on industrial symbiosis is rich in addressing case-specific issues.
However, we see that focusing on implementing specific cases results in hardly gen-
eralizable solution concepts. E.g., focusing on single-shot 1-1 relations dismisses the
temporal as well as strategic (coalition-formation) dynamics in ISS. We observe the
lack of generic methods—able to capture the above mentioned dimensions (i.e., TE,
SA, RB, and NC)—for designing and coordinating ISS. In principle, ISS is a highly
dynamic MAS, as it demonstrates normative and strategic dynamics in a temporal and
resource-bounded context.
To address these dimensions, we follow the idea that the formal representation of
multi-stakeholder systems [16,18] enables systematic reasoning about their evolution
and fosters coordinating their complex behavior. This motivates the need for introducing
a new line of scientific inquiry on multiagent models for industrial symbiosis systems.
In the following, we elaborate on main requirements for engineering such systems and
propose a methodological foundation for it. We also discuss that this domain of mul-
tiagent systems application calls for integrating some (not yet integrated) multiagent
formalisms.
2 A Normative Multiagent Approach
We present a methodological foundation to enable modeling ISS and specifying its tem-
poral, resource-bounded, and strategic aspects. Building on this, we discuss the norma-
tivity of industrial symbiosis and motivate the need for employing norm-aware coordi-
nation mechanisms.
2.1 Modeling ISS
We see ISS as a multiagent system in which each agent’s action “consumes” resources—
either financially, physically, or both. A rich method for representing and reasoning
about such systems is Resource-Bounded Alternating-time Temporal Logic (RB-ATL)—
introduced in [4]. Building on an adopted version of the semantic machinery of RB-
ATL, an ISS can be modeled as a Resource-Bounded Concurrent Game Structure (RB–
CGS[4])M = (N,Res,Q,Act, d, c, o) where: N = {a1, ... , an} is the set of n firms
involved in ISS; Res = {res1, . . . , resr} is a set of r resource types; Q is a non-empty
set of states;Act is a non-empty set of actions; d : Q×N 7→ P(Act)\{∅} is a function
that in each state q ∈ Q, assigns a non-empty set of actions d(q, a) ⊆ Act to each firm
a ∈ N (by D(q), we denote the set of all joint actions σ = (α1, . . . , αn) such that
αi ∈ d(q, ai)); partial function c : Q×N×Act 7→ Nr maps a state q ∈ Q, firm a ∈ N ,
and an action α ∈ d(q, a) to a vector of integers, where a positive integer in position
i indicates the consumption of resi ∈ Res by action a; and o : Q × D(q) 7→ Q is
a deterministic transition function—modeling the evolution of the ISS—that for each
state q ∈ Q and joint action σ ∈ D(q), returns a state that results from the execution of
σ in q.
In our suggested formalization, Res may consist of both financial as well as phys-
ical resources. Specifying such a set of consumable resources, modeling their con-
sumption using the cost function c, and combining these two with ATL-based transi-
tion systems enables modeling the real-life behavior of ISS as industrial organizations
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[32]. Such a modeling framework is flexible with respect to the set of available actions
(Act), that the ISS designer intends to consider in its model. For instance, one may
limit Act to physical actions (e.g., sending or recycling some quantity of a resource),
consider communicative actions [15] (e.g., informing another agent and updating its
belief-/knowledge-base), or specify a more complex mix of institutional and physical
acts [12] (e.g., offering/accepting a deal or sending/receiving a resource). Note that the
use of RB–CGS enables relying on computationally attractive algorithms for verifying
temporal, resource-bounded, and strategic properties [5]. Following the successful use
of RB–CGS and related resource-aware action models to specify real-world systems
[2], we propose contextualizing RB–CGS for ISS modeling and its integration with
norm-aware techniques for ISS coordination.
2.2 Normativity of ISS
Using this representation, one can reason about the evolution of an ISS (temporarily)
in which firms are able to execute their decisional plans (strategic) that are bounded to
consumable resources (resource-boundedness). We argue that the autonomy of firms,
the availability of resources, and the evolution of ISS raise the concern that we may see
undesirable situations.
In principle—from the perspective of the ISS designer/engineer—an ISS may go to
an (un)desirable state, a firm may execute an (un)desirable action, or in a more complex
level, an ISSmay perform an (un)desirable behavior. This is, to ascribe normative labels
to states, actions, and behaviors.
State Normativity: In an ISS, the modeler can represent potential implementations
of a relation in states. For instance, firms may either implement a fair benefit allocation
(represented by state qf ) or otherwise occurs (represented by state qu). Then, the system
designer can aim for suppressing unfair relations by ascribing undesirability to qu and
accordingly implement normative mechanisms to coordinate the behavior of ISS.
Action Normativity: In addition to the above-mentioned state normativity, the execu-
tion of some actions (in some specific states) can also be bad/good. For example, the act
of transporting a hazardous resource or defecting from an unfulfilled commitment (i.e.,
when the promise is not yet satisfied) can both be seen undesirable. More generally, a
subset of available actions (to an agent in a state) can be labeled as undesirable.
Behavior Normativity: Specifying state and action normativity is not sufficient to ex-
press some more complex undesirabilities (e.g., those that are concerned with the order
of execution of some actions). In principle, the semantic notion of system’s normative
behavior is about the desirability of a chain of actions/events/states. For instance, even
if neither sending an offer, receiving an offer, nor accepting the offer are bad actions,
their execution in a wrong order can be an undesirable system behavior (e.g., the chain
of events in which a firm first accepts an offer and then receives it can be an undesirable
one). Note that ISS is designed to bring about a stable and resilient practice of circular
economy, hence has to be aware of—and able to control—such normative situations.
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2.3 ISS Behavior and Normative Semantics
First, we show how our suggested modeling structure enables specifying the ISS behav-
ior as well as its normativity.
Definition 1 (ISS Behavior). Given an ISSM, we denote the set of infinite sequences
of states by Qω . A sequence λ = q0, q1, . . . ∈ Qω is an ISS behavior iff for all tuples
of states (qi, qi+1), there exist a σ ∈ D(qi) such that o(qi, σ) = qi+1. The set of all
possible behaviors ofM is denoted by ΛM (Λ ifM is clear from the context).
While in some cases, specifying the normativity of states/actions is sufficient, the
semantically rich notion of behavior normativity enables reasoning about and coordi-
nating the more complex behavioral aspect of ISS.
Definition 2 (ISS Behavioral Norm, Compliance, Violation). A norm N is a subset
of ISS behaviors Λ (i.e., N ⊆ Λ). An ISS behavior λ complies with N (for short, λ is
N -compliant) iff λ ∈ N . Otherwise, λ violates N (for short, λ is N -violation).
Although the subject of norm synthesis/evolution in ISS is important, in this pro-
posal we assume norms to be given and fixed. Such norms can be either derived using
data-driven methods or defined from the perspective of a third-party/legislative agent6.
Observation 1 (Expressivity) Specifying ISS behaviors (using RB–CGS) is also ex-
pressive for modeling state and action normativity. State normativity can be derived
using a single-state ISS behavior while action normativity can be modeled based on a
two-state ISS behavior and the action profile that connects the two.
Given a formal representation of ISS, one may ask whether verifying normative
propositions—e.g., the compliance of the ISS behavior to a given norm—are computa-
tionally feasible. Relying on well-established results of [4], we have that Given an ISS
M, verifying the validity of (normative) propositions has the computational complexity
of O(`2|Res|+1 × |M|) where ` is the size of the formula.
We presented a methodological foundation, rooted in the semantic machinery of
RB–CGS, for representing and reasoning about ISS behavior. Next, we propose that for
maintaining the ISS behavior—within an acceptable spectrum—norm-based coordina-
tion mechanisms are applicable and appropriate system engineering tools.
2.4 Coordinating ISS
While normativity refers to the property of ISS (behavior) to be desirable or unde-
sirable, normative coordination mechanisms are mainly methods for flexible adminis-
tration to keep the system (behavior) within an acceptable spectrum. Operationalizing
norms and employing norm-based instruments to ensure desirable system behaviors is
6 One may construct a norm considering the consumption of resources (e.g., if a behavior is
in-line with available resources in Res), may model a norm to specify performable behaviors
under a budget limit (e.g., if aggregating all the costs—modeled by the c function—is under a
threshold), or may combine the two to formulate more complex norms.
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a well-established principle in multiagent systems research. This includes proposals on
applicability of normative coordination methods as a tool for operating electronic in-
stitutions [1], for monitoring commitments in multiagent organizations [12], and for
implementing protocols in norm-governed networks [6,37].
Relying on this literature and considering the normative characteristics of ISS, we
suggest the following “normative regimentation-/sanction-/reparation-based coordina-
tion toolbox”—as a basis for contextualized coordination mechanisms—to ensure the
normatively desirable behavior in ISS, i.e., to enforce norm compliant ISS behaviors.
In each part, we present the intuition and briefly elaborate on how the method can be
implemented in the RB–CGS settings.
Regimentation-Based Approach: The main idea behind regimentation, as a tool for
enforcing “good” behaviors, is to implement a mechanism that guarantees the pre-
vention of all the norm-violating behaviors. In RB–CGS setting, regimentation can be
implemented by updating the transition system (in specific, by implementing a norm-
supervisor function that updates the d function) and forbidding actions that may result
in a bad ISS behavior. As elaborated in [11], ensuring that all the bad behaviors are
avoided may result in avoiding some good behaviors as well. Although this is a “tight”
form of coordination, it is applicable for engineering critical ISS (e.g., for implementing
industrial symbiosis on nuclear wastes, where no degree of violation is acceptable). But
in a more flexible ISS—and considering the sensitivity of industrial domain to restric-
tive administration methods—we suggest coordination mechanisms of a more “relax”
nature: sanction-/reparation-based methods.
Sanction-Based Approach: In sanction-based methods, the idea is to enforce good
behaviors by making bad behaviors more costly7. I.e., bad behaviors may happen but
the aim is to nudge the behavior towards good one. In RB–CGS representation of ISS,
sanctions can be implemented by updating the cost function c (e.g., by increasing the ac-
cumulated cost of actions, included in a norm-violating behavior). An alternative would
be to impose sanctions on firms that are able to avoid bad behaviors (i.e., sanctioning
with respect to strategic potentials) or by applying preference-aware mechanisms[8].
Reparation-Based Approach: In general, the reparation-based approach gives the op-
portunity to the firms to “repair” a norm-violating behavior—e.g., by postponing the
sanction imposition. In ISS coordination, this is to expect that firms will return/recover
the system to norm-compliant behavior as they tend to avoid being imposed with a
sanction. To implement this, one may extend the set of norm-compliant ISS behaviors
by including repaired behaviors. For instance, the designer may tolerate any norm vio-
lating behavior λv only if it is immediately followed by state qr, where visiting qr is the
result of (collectively) paying a compensation value cv (lower than the sanction value
sv). Thus, if the involved firms immediately pay cv after a violation λv , they ensure that
the behavior is repaired, hence will not be sanctioned. To fine-tune cv and to determine
the number of steps that imposing a sanction can be postponed are relevant concerns
for refining ISS coordination mechanisms.
7 In general, norm-aware sanctioning refers to the imposition of penalties/taxes when the be-
havior is undesirable. However, it can be also employed for introducing negative sanctions, in
terms of rewards/subsidies, to encourage desirable behaviors [27].
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3 Open Problems and Engineering Challenges
As motivated earlier, we call for scientific investigation on multiagent models for in-
dustrial symbiosis systems. Below, we elaborate on some open problems in this new
domain of study and highlight the relation to relevant multiagent techniques.
Transaction Cost Economics: One of the main advantages of implementing well-
designed ISS—in contrast to traditional ad-hoc industrial symbiosis relations—is to
reduce the total transaction cost. This can be achieved using automatized smart con-
tracts, and in turn by eliminating the searching and negotiation costs. In principle, such
dynamics of transaction cost affect the stability and fairness of cost/benefit allocation
mechanisms. We believe that this gap can be captured building on the line of contri-
bution on cost of stability [25,7] and by developing dynamic allocation methods, in
contrast to approaches that take a static characteristic function as given.
Incentive Engineering: To support the implementation of an ISS—with the aim to
guarantee its resilience and stability—legislative bodies may introduce external sup-
port in terms of monetary incentives. This is either by providing subsidies to support
socio-environmentally desirable ISS implementations or by imposing taxes to suppress
undesirable practices. To have a successful allocation of incentives, we lack policy-
support tools, aware of the structure and dynamics of ISS. To tackle this, we see that
involved firms can be modeled as resource-controllers in an ISS game. This approach
enables the applicability of incentive engineering methods for ensuring properties in
boolean games [34].
Governance: In an ISS, firms will get involved in commitments (in the institutional
level) and can affect the state of resources (in the physical level). To be able to specify,
monitor, and maintain a well-behaving ISS, we need multiagent commitment gover-
nance frameworks and interorganizational communication protocols. Following [30],
we see norms as a basis for “administration of stakeholders by stakeholders” and for
offering coordination as a service [17] in ISS. While we elaborated on norm-based coor-
dination approaches, specifying ISS communication languages, identifying their prop-
erties, and developing norm-based governance platforms for ISS are still open prob-
lems. Moreover, ISS are expected to be long-term and to evolve over time. Then to cap-
ture their dynamicity and accordingly updating the governance models, participation
and feedback of industrial symbiosis practitioners are among the key requirements. For
such a purpose, integrating participatory policy analysis models [24] with norm-aware
models [31,20,3] would be a suggested direction.
Organizational Characterization: For design and coordination of ISS, a critical point
is to understand, model, and reason about the dynamics of roles, relationships, and au-
thority structures. E.g., in some forms of ISS the role of facilitating firms (i.e., broker
agents) is crucial while in some, resource recycling plants play a key role. In our pro-
posed ISS model, we simply reason about action-based dynamics of ISS, thus abstract
from organizational structures and notions such as roles, obligations, permissions, and
prohibitions. However, in multiplex ISS scenarios, it is more natural to introduce high-
level organizational notions (1) for capturing the complex dynamics of ISS and (2) for
coordinating its behavior accordingly. This is to move from “ ISS as a multiagent sys-
tem” to “ISS as a multiagent organization”. To this end, one may develop a mapping
between multiagent organizational paradigms [18] and different forms of ISS. This calls
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for identifying the set of roles in various forms of ISS—with respect to firms’ control on
resources and their strategic position—and accordingly verifying the appropriateness of
organizational structures. For instance, while hierarchical structures seem applicable for
material-based ISS (due to geographical proximity of firms in an industrial cluster), a
coalition-based structure might be appropriate for service-based ISS (due to involve-
ment of potentially distant clusters).
Social Aspects, Trust, and Openness: While an ISS designer provides a secure plat-
form (to nurture stable relations), the stability of relations also depends of the dynam-
ics of trust and firms’ socially-bounded autonomy—in the sense of [10]. Note that in
ISS, we are dealing with (semi)autonomous firm managers who act with respect to
(not only) the economic analysis on obtainable benefits (but also) the set of subjective
preferences—that may be affected by social practices or trust dynamics [13]. Thus, cap-
turing agents’ preferences and trust in reasoning about the behavior of ISS would be an
interesting attempt for applying available trust formalizations [33,29,19] in a practical
domain. A practical way forward would be to capture firms’ subjective preferences—on
the list of potential symbiotic coalitions— and employ it as a filtering measure on the
feasibility of economically profitable instances [39]. Finally, while most frameworks
for modeling organizations focus on a closed system, there is a lack of open multia-
gent models to specify ISS8. Following [28,14], we believe that allowing the ability to
leave/join an ISS (as an industrial institution) calls for a new form of dynamic stabil-
ity/resilience analysis. For such a purpose, one may employ financial incentives [23],
use social bounds [19], or apply expectation-aware methods [22].
4 Concluding Remarks
We presented a normative multiagent perspective on engineering (ISS). This includes:
(1) a formal specification that enables modeling the temporal, strategic, and resource-
bounded characteristics of ISS, (2) operational semantics to develop computational
models for such systems, and (3) the sketch of mechanisms for ensuring desirable sit-
uations in ISS. We also showed the expressiveness of resource-bounded semantics for
practical applications and elaborated on how RB–CGS can be combined with norm-
based coordination mechanisms. We deem that the successful application of multiagent-
based methods requires taking into account the dynamics of the application domain
and fine-tuning the methods to develop fit-for-purpose technologies. Our contribution
is the first attempt in proposing norm-aware resource-bounded multiagent frameworks
for specifying ISS, verifying its normative behavior, and coordinating it towards desir-
able outcomes. As an immediate extension, we aim to work on logical characterization
of the presented concepts and to pursue their pilot deployment in industrial clusters.
Acknowledgement: The first two authors acknowledge the received funding from Eu-
ropean Union’s Horizon 2020 programme under grant agreement No. 680843.
8 Formal modeling of open MAS is still an open problem. This motivates limiting the attention
to a specific class, e.g., multiagent ISS, and aiming to tackle the problem under its boundaries.
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